

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Propaganda Analysis Activities of the Office of Operations

25X1A5A1

REFERENCES:

a. [] A Report
to the Office of Operations, CIA, 1 April 1955.

b. []
Analysis: A Report on Intelligence Method to the
Office of Operations, CIA, 15 April 1955.

25X1A5A1

25X1A5A1

1. The [] has completed a survey of the propaganda analysis operations of this Office and their relationship to political analysis performed elsewhere in the intelligence community. The findings and recommendations of this survey, conducted by [] a recognized authority in the field of propaganda analysis (called "communications analysis" by []), are set forth in references a and b, which have been provided to the DD(I) separately.

25X1A5A1

25X1A5A1

2. Reference a distinguishes between "propaganda analysis" and "political analysis" in several ways, all of which meet with OO views and which create the framework for the recommendations of this memorandum. First, "propaganda analysis" is described as a specialized technique performed upon a well-defined circumscribed body of raw materials, as contrasted with "political analysis" which is broader in scope of problems covered, in the variety of materials used, and in the variety of analytical techniques employed. Secondly, "propaganda analysis" is not a substitute for other established intelligence techniques, but rather it is one type of evidence in the form of "unfinished" intelligence for those who integrate all available intelligence. Thirdly, the specialized, systematic examination of propaganda in the light of highly detailed knowledge about propaganda behavior, by full-time propaganda analysts does not deny to the political analyst full access to the basic raw materials.

3. [] principal recommendations are the following:

25X1A5A1

a. Integration: That a single propaganda analysis operation be set up with responsibility for over-all scrutiny of all types of Communist propaganda, irrespective of source or media; and that this be accomplished by combining into a single operation the separate analysis operations currently performed in [] and []

FOIAB3B1

b. Autonomy: That the propaganda analysis operation be

25X1

~~SECRET~~DRAFT

kept autonomous from all-source political analysis activities in order to preserve the systematic character of its methods and so provide independent evidence on intelligence problems, and that its analysts be encouraged to draw inferences about policy calculations underlying propaganda strategy.

- c. Expansion: That the integrated operation increase its analytic coverage of published material not received through radio monitoring and devote greater effort to long-range intelligence problems and to "instrumental" studies which would define the patterns of propaganda behavior.
- d. Coordination: That better coordination between propaganda and political analysis be sought through briefing and liaison arrangements; by organizing joint projects; by making information available to propaganda analysts on classified U. S. actions, capabilities and intentions when these are calculated to result in propaganda action and reaction or a change in political posture.

That any survey of the problems of organization and coordination of propaganda analysis in the intelligence community be undertaken at a higher level than OO, and not by 25X1A5A1

- e. Presentation: That the presentation of the results of propaganda analysis be improved by more clearly stating and documenting the evidence and reasoning used.

4. This Office is in general agreement with the recommendations and proposes to implement them as indicated in sub-paragraph b below. Comment on the findings is inserted as sub-paragraph a by way of introducing OO proposals. The comments and proposals are keyed to the "Summary of Recommendations" Reference a, and the "Summary: Recommendations and Findings" Reference b, by the indexing in the left-hand margin. Paragraph 5 deals with recommendations which in our view should be deferred.

25X1A5A1

a. OO Comment on Findings.

Ref. a, II

- (1) OO agree that important improvement in quality and scope of propaganda analysis will result from integration.

~~SECRET~~

Ref. b, 4

25X1A5A1

- (2) Although [] prefers the term "Communications Analysis" it is believed that continued use of "Propaganda Analysis" will avoid confusion with certain functions of OC and NSA. The differentiation between "Political Analysis" and "Propaganda Analysis" and the definition and evaluation of the latter as an intelligence method coincide with OC views precisely.

Ref. b, 5

- (3) [] re-affirms that Propaganda Analysis offers independent evidence on intelligence problems, but limits this capability in ratio to the strength or validity of generalizations about the structure and behavior of Communist propaganda systems which have been or can be developed. OC concurs.

b. OO Proposals on Recommendations.

Ref. a, I

- (1) It is proposed to establish an integrated Propaganda Analysis Branch in [] made up of the present [] Radio Propaganda Branch and the FPD Press Propaganda Coordinator.

FOIAB3B1

FOIAB3B1

DISCUSSION: [] is preferred as locus for the activity because: the major propaganda analysis operation is well established there; an analysis operation located in [] can make best use of [] field stations, with their relatively inexpensive foreign national personnel, not only to get a selection and processing of broadcast material suitable for its purposes, but also in the procurement and analytic scrutiny of unbroadcast published materials (see (2) below); a separate Propaganda Analysis Division would require duplicative administrative overhead, while an OO Staff Section of the required size would be unwieldy; rapid clear text communication with the field is available nowhere else, and is necessary for verification and checking.

FOIAB3B1

Ref. a, III
and IV

- (2) It is proposed to procure selected publications at [] field stations, scrutinize them, and file translated summaries, texts and collations by teletype, following the general procedures now used for broadcast material.

~~SECRET~~

D R A F T

DISCUSSION: These publications would subsequently be forwarded to Washington. It is believed that substantial savings in time can be made in FID exploitation through [] field procurement. Furthermore, the publications would be available for more thorough examination in the analysis of propaganda. A prerequisite to the initiation of this procurement would be coordination with GCD and the NSCID 16 Committee.

FOIAB3B1

Ref. a, III,
IV and VII

- (3) It is proposed to recruit analysts with linguistic skills insofar as possible, and to offer language training opportunities to those analysts not already qualified.

Ref. a, VI

- (4) Within the new Propaganda Analysis Branch it is proposed to continue the former [] study of Sino-Soviet relations and to expand the study to include all available propaganda.

FOIAB3B1

Ref. a, V

- (5) It is proposed to initiate instrumental and enabling studies, which OO agrees are of the greatest importance, as soon as an easing of the personnel situation will permit.

Ref. a, VIII

- (6) In view of the vital importance and considerable success achieved in the past two years in long-range studies based on propaganda, it is proposed to give priority to the hiring of qualified people so that maximum redistribution of effort to long-range studies may be effected with minimum dislocation to current analysis projects.

Ref. b, 3

- (7) It is proposed that the "inferential analysis" of propaganda presently performed by the Radio Propaganda Branch, [] be carried on in the new expanded activity.

FOIAB3B1

Ref. b, 6, 7,
8, and 11

- (8) It is proposed to improve coordination with other offices doing related work, particularly within the DD/I area by:

- (a) Increased informal liaison.
- (b) Seeking consumer comment and suggestions on effective presentation of the findings of propaganda analysis.
- (c) Establishing a position in the Branch for a specialist in presentation.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

- (d) Arranging more convenient access to sensitive information for part of the Branch.
- (e) Formulating joint research teams for suitable projects.
- (f) Arranging for more briefings of propaganda analysts by all-source and political analysts.
- (g) Regular notice to OCI, OHR, OIR, and OIR Department of State, of projects underway in the Branch.

25X1A5A1

5. The following ☐ recommendations should be deferred until the new propaganda analysis activity has had an opportunity to mobilize and train personnel for the added scope of its work.

- Ref. 4, 1 a. A review of the doctrine on the intelligence value of propaganda analysis prepared by ☐ should be made, but not until several years after the new activity is launched. 25X1A5A1
- Ref. b, 2 b. OO does not agree that a "high level" survey of organization and coordination of propaganda analysis is required. Informal coordination with the Department of State, OHR, has been effected.
- Ref. b, 9 c. Efforts to determine the extent to which lack of information on classified U. S. activities affects the ability of propaganda analysts to interpret correctly the underlying significance of Communist propaganda, and research on the extent to which Communist propaganda makes use of classified Soviet intelligence on U. S. activities, capabilities and intentions, are sophisticated problems that should be deferred until well after the reorganization.

6. It is recommended that you approve:

- a. The courses of action set forth under paragraphs 4 b and 5 a, b, and c of this memorandum.
- b. The preparation by OO of a project to implement the proposals in paragraph 4 b (1), (2) and (3).

GEORGE G. CAREY
Assistant Director for Operations

~~SECRET~~
DRAFT

- (d) Arranging more convenient access to sensitive information for part of the Branch.
- (e) Formulating joint research teams for suitable projects.
- (f) Arranging for more briefings of propaganda analysts by all-source and political analysts.
- (g) Regular notice to OSI, ONS, ONSI, and OIR Department of State, of projects underway in the Branch.

Ref. b, 2

- (9) OO does not agree that a "high level" survey of organization and coordination of propaganda analysis is required. Informal coordination with the Department of State, OIR, has been effected.

5. The following ☐ 25X1A5A1 recommendations should be deferred until the new propaganda analysis activity has had an opportunity to mobilize and train new personnel.

Ref. b, 1

- a. A review of the doctrine on the intelligence value of propaganda analysis prepared by ☐ should be made, but not until several years after the integration has been launched.

25X1A5A1

Ref. b, 9

- b. Efforts to determine the extent to which lack of information on classified U. S. activities affects the ability of propaganda analysts to interpret correctly the underlying significance of Communist propaganda, and research on the extent to which Communist propaganda makes use of classified Soviet intelligence on U. S. activities, capabilities and intentions, are sophisticated problems that should be deferred until well after the reorganization.

6. It is recommended that you approve:

- a. The courses of action set forth under paragraphs 4 b, and 5 a, b, and c of this memorandum.
- b. The preparation by OO of a project to implement the proposals in paragraph 4 b (1), (2) and (3).

GEORGE G. CAREY
Assistant Director for Operations